




Abstract: In his article the author attempts to investigate a logic model of space
of thought with formal means of category theory. Concept of space of thought was
elaborated by modern Russian psychologist A. Kurpatov. According to the author
of the article, it would be appropriate to use a category of complete Heyting-
valued sets as a model of space of thought, provided that certain methodological
assumptions will be accepted. Same model could be used in a number of approaches
in the area of perspective AGI developement.
Key words: topos, Heyting-valued set, space of thought, intellectual object, generic
point, gluing axiom.
I.
The task we are eager to solve within the limits of declared theme of
present research can be formulated as follows: to mathematize core principles
of brain’s work. We will proceed from the assumption that human’s brain is
extremely effective machine capable of decision making in situations with
radical incompleteness of information. This is so by very the same brain’s
construction which has been justified and is still justifying itself in a process
of natural selection.
Therefore, when trying to build general artificial intelligence it would
be productive not to emulate human’s central nervous system, but rather to
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reproduce those abstract principles that are implemented in brain’s cognitive
activity, i. e. its ways of information processing, deduction or making decisions
considered as neutral with regard and neurobiological characteristics of living
tissue.
We start with the concept of intellectual object and will consider any
intellectual object as always-already-derived from other, more simple intellectual
objects. It would be a mistake to assume presence of some initial (primitime,
elementary) intellectual objects, since every intellectual object, even the
most "simple"one, aggregates from different, separate stimuli (which affect
different, separate receptors). All these intellectual objects get their appropriate
status (disposition, weight, value, sounding) - that of ’intellectual object no
sooner than at the moment we perceive it in some kind of relation with
ourselves (where "our-self"considered as any mental content whatsoever), as
a "thing"that has certain "meaning-for-me".1
Here we must pay attention to several important points at once: first,
intellectual object’s relation "with me"does not presuppose any awareness of
it, or it’s representation in consciousness - it should be enough if something
would be perceived, differentiated in extent sufficient for this "something"would
be taken into account somehow, would make a difference in the future.
But, of course, composite intellectual objects may well be represented in
consciousness. Second, because, as we mentioned earlier, the main task of
cognition is forecasting, or fabrication of the competitive ("farther-sighted")
future, the overall presentation of perceived intellectual object will depend on
our predisposition,or, as phenomenologists would say - on our intentionality2.
1Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 38
2In phenomenology, intentionality is the characteristic of consciousness whereby it is
conscious of something i.e., its directedness toward an object.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/intentionality-philosophy
"Experiences are intentional. This being-directed-toward is not just joined to the
experience by way of a mere addition, and occasionally as an accidental reaction,
as if experiences could be what they are without the intentional relation. With the
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To put it differently - expectation affects perception. Something very similar
we find in Kurpatov’s "Tractatus Psychosophicus". Author believes that we
do not determine a meaning of the thing deliberately - it is determined by
what thing is me to myself. Hence, meaning of a thing is always some need
that forces me to develop a certain thing from the world. 3 And third: we will
consider the very process of thought not a "mind movement not a "successive
transition"from one set of propositions to another, but rather a construction
of a suitable intellectual object. Thus, we strip the cognition of traditionally
attributed dynamics - it is more like pending in uncertainty which is almost
literally abolished (in Gegel’s sense of the German word Aufheben) as soon
as suitable pattern has been recognized - suitable intellectual object has been
constructed.
Taking into account everything mentioned above it is fair to say that
even the most elementary intellectual object is indeed not that elementary
and really is combined from at least three "elements":
- a set of data (А);
- myself (Ω);
- relation with myself, which is, generaly speaking, is the function of my
internal state/expectation (f).
From now on, every time we will use the term "intellectual object we will




intentionality of the experiences there announces itself, rather, the essential structure
of the purely psychical". - Edmund Husserl
3Kurpatov А. Tractatus Psychosophicus.. - М, 2007. P. 36
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Speaking formally, А and Ω - are "objects"of some sort, and an "arrow"−→
- is a functional relation. We can see that the whole construction, although it
consists of three self-sufficient objects, at the same time appears as a certain
integrity: relation is always given by some rule, but at the same time the
source and the target of the rule are also constitutive for the relation itself.
Sometimes, to make more distinct that it is the relation that is constitutive
for the whole construction we will write: f : A −→ Ω.
Collection of data which belong to the set A as its elements also, generally
speaking, are composed intellectual objects. But we must start somewhere,
so we will proceed from assumingly “primitive” elements x, y ∈ A, keeping in
mind that their “primitiveness” is merely an assumption that strongly depend
on particular context.
We must pay special attention to the set Ω as well,because in our construction
it will play very specific role - that of the instance of experience (in a sense
of affectation). In this subject of experience we will be interested most of
all in his ability of differentiation. Thus, the structure of object Ω which
models subject’s ability of differentiation must satisfy certain requirements:
first of all, it must be a partially ordered set, so to its elements could be
assigned more or less high values. That is, a candidate set for Ω must have a
partial order structure. Every interaction, or relation, although it has infinite
number of modalities, always can be characterised in terms of intensities of
these modalities. And these intensities are partially ordered. In other words,
we will use Ω as an existential scale - or simply a ruler, that will measure
the differences. With the values of this ruler we as well might want to do
set theoretic operations of union and intersection - it will endow our set of
existential values with some basic “logic”. So, it is mostly appropriate to take
Heyting algebra as such partially ordered set.
Now let’s try to understand more clear what kind of differences elements
of set A can have and how we can measure these differences. Referring
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to the Kurpatov’s text once again: "Our mind leans irresistibly to sum
up all collection of stimuli into one comprehensible, lucid and supposedly
consistent view on reality, i. e. to create a "reality effect". This representation
of reality is in fact some sort of filter-interpreter - every new stimulus,
when caught by, figuratively speaking, gravity field of certain representation
system, inevitably changes its trajectory, so to speak - some of them are
repulsed (are ignored), some other, complimentary, are attracted, while some
other still are modified (interpreted) in order to fit in existent viewpoint."4
All said above grasps very well with a concept of expectation: on every
level of perception - from the most primitive, genetically determined ability
for differentiation to utterly conscious, abstract concept - we in fact deal with
situation, with some expected state of affairs. Respectively, we expect from
the elements of the whole situation that they will appear in it as "this"or
"that". As a result, it makes sense to say to what extent every element
included into intellectual object A is, first - different from itself (in a sense
of what we expect to see in it’s place) and second - to what extent this
particular element is relevant to the whole situation, i. e. how close is it to
the other elements that were discerned in this situation.
Hereinafter we will say that there is a function of expectation ExpA :
A × A → Ω determined on set A which for every two elements x, y ∈ A
assigns a degree of their coherence, or proximity q on Heyting scale Ω so that
∀a, b, c ∈ A:
ExpA(a, b) = ExpA(b, a)
ExpA(a, b) ∧ ExpA(b, c) ≤ ExpA(a, c)
We see that these two imposed conditions are quite weak and they become
even more comprehensible when we try to interpret the degree of difference
4Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 57
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(or - proximity) topologically - as proximity in space - and we will measure it
as a distance. then our conditions will take a form of axioms of metric with
the only difference that proximity of intellectual object to itself doesn’t have
to be maximal. Degree of coherence of intellectual object with itself can be
understood as degree of proximity to it’s own essence (or participation in
Idea in Platonic sense) and denoted as EssA(x)
Weakness of axioms of such generalized metric turns out to be extremely
convenient also because these axioms are satisfied by whole class of functions
and variability on them can easily be interpreted as variation of internal state
of the subject of experience.
So,from now on, by intellectual object we will understand quite intricately
constructed, synthetic object A := (A,ExpA), comprising set of data А and
function of expectation ExpA : A×A→ Ω, which depends essentially on the
subject of experience and her internal state. In mathematics such object А
called Heyting-valued set, or, since values of function ExpA belongs to Ω -
an Ω-set, while the collection of all objects of this type endowed with some
additional structure transforms this collection into the category of Ω-sets.
Study of this additional structure is what we will do next.
Intellectual objects are not some chaotic, messy collection, but they form
complex hierarchy, i. e. it is a highly structured collection with many varied
relationships found between it’s elements. We will call a relation between
intellectual objects intellectual function. According to Kurpatov, the action
of this intellectual function is the only instrument of thought: we operate
with intellectual objects inside our own head producing in that way more and
more relations between them. These new relations are in fact new intellectual
objects. So, when we say we are "looking for understanding"of something, in
reality we communicate our desire to create an intellectual object which will
be a solution to the problem we are occupied with at the moment.5
5Kurpatov A. "Methodology of Thought. A Draft". SPb, 2018. P. 117
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Thus, our immediate goal is to outline some generalized space for the
consistent discourse, where we could control actions of intellectual function.
As a model of such generalized space we will examine a category - algebraic
structure that loosely can be described as a collection of "objects"linked by
"arrows".
Now let’s recall that the objects A, B, C... which we want to "connect"with
the arrows are Heyting-valued sets and thereby they have quite rich structure
- actually, they themselves are the result of certain relation - relation of the
form f : A × A → Ω, to be precise. So, basically we must define functional
relationship r : A→ B,that in itself is the relation between relations, which
means that this type of connection must be additionally restricted, so that
these restrictions would take into account the internal structure of both set
A and set B.
If we will think of function ExpA : A × A → Ω as of encoding of
information about subject’s system of differentiations which she discovers
in the situation, it becomes quite obvious that relation r : A→ B also must
depend on this subject of experience Ω and must take into consideration
somehow this information. If r would be an arbitrary function it would simply
be a rule establishing correspondence between elements of sets A and B and
we could fix the fact of such correspondence as equality r(a) = b, where
a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Now, to stay strictly we could interpret this equality in
the same terms of expectation, i. e. to assign more or less high values q ∈ Ω
to all couples (r(a), b), depending on how r(a) close to b. Detailed formal
definition requires quite a lot of technical work6, but we will skip it here,
since category of complete7 Ω- sets allows for mush less technical and much
6Look for details in Goldblatt R. (2006) Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. P. 277-278
7Why exactly space of thought can and must be identified with the category of complete
Ω- sets is outlined id detail in Egorychev I. Thought and Being are the Same: Categorial
Rendition of the Parmenidian Thesis. // Studies in Logic, Gramma and rhetoric, 46 (59),
2016.
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more meaningful interpretation.8 As we already mentioned relation between
intellectual objects must take into account the information contained in these
objects which can be basically reduced to certain system of differences and
identities. In other words, relation must respect the distribution of differences
and identities that has been already done by function of expectation Exp, i.
e. r : A → B can be represented as ordinary set theoretic function which
conserves all those differentiations and identities. It does not create anything
- neither increase identity of element with itself, nor increase it’s difference
from the others:
∀a, b ∈ A : EssBr(a) ≤ EssAa
ExpA(a, b) ≤ ExpB(r(a), r(b))
II.
At last, we have a minimal set of instruments which we may use for
modeling of action of intellectual function as a process of building of more and
more complex intellectual objects. It has been shown earlier 9 that the action
of intellectual function could be formalized in category-theoretic language as
exponentiation, which corresponds to the sophistication of intellectual object
B by means of raising it to the power of existent knowledge/representations
A, i. e. construction of so called exponential object BA and as constructing of
so called hom-functor HomC(−, B) which puts every object A that belongs
to subcategory C ⊆ Set composed of relevant objects and supplemented
with all relationships between them into correspondence with the set of all
8Borceux, F. (1994) Handbook of Categorical Algebra, volume 3, P.160.
9Look for details: Egorychev I. Categorial analysis of A. Kurpatov’s "Methodology of
thought"in context of perspective AGI development. http://philsci-archive.pitt.
edu/18343/
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relations between object B and object A. Such operation is called Yoneda
embedding.
But a world of intellectual function implemented as a category of complete
Heyting valued sets admits (besides exponentiation and Yoneda embedding)
at least two important formal procedures that also can have manifestly
epistemological interpretation: first one consists in radical changing of function
of expectation ExpA inside intellectual object A := (A,ExpA), which can be
achieved above all things by augmenting a support set with itself: A ∈ A.
Such procedure, strictly speaking, is forbidden in axiomatic set theory.10 This
prohibition allowed mathematicians, in particular, to free Cantor’s "naive"set
theory from paradoxes that sometimes caused by such autoreferentiality (the
most famous of these paradoxes is the Russell paradox). But ontological
consequences of such paradoxical augmentation are so significant that we
decided at least theoretically to consider them.
The second procedure is substantially relies on the fact that the category
of complete Ω- sets is Grothendieck topos and is categorically equivalent
to the category of sheaves built over Heyting algebra Ω. At the time this
procedure was investigated in detail by Alain Badiou who construed the
gluing axiom that an arbitrary functor must satisfy to be a sheaf as a subject’s
possibility to make reasonable decisions in a world.
Understanding of both procedures procedures requires substantial mathematical
background, but we think that they both can be used in some implementations
of artificial intelligence based on Brain Principles Programming. That is why
in the present article we will investigate these procedures in detail.




A world of intellectual function obviously has its own dynamics - its
objects are permanently modifying so that their values on the scale Ω are
appropriately change. As we remember, in general case Ω is Heyting algebra
which determines so called "internal logic of topos".Hence, a world, strictly
speaking, is a sum of all such modifications. It means that change, from one
side, is already presupposed by the same logic, which is immanent to the
world of intellectual function, but, from the other hand, is also restricted
by its structure. In other words, the limits of what is reasonable in the
world are essentially dependent on composition of Ω. As a result, we may
witness considerable variations in certain element’s valuation on Ω without
any transformation of Ω itself. A collection of all such variations, or we would
rather say - of all that are reasonable by subject in its most explicit form can
be illustrated with categorial construction called hyperdoctrine.
Hyperdoctrine h is a functor that puts in correspondence with each object
X of a category T (in this particular, explicitly logical context a category
is considered as a theory and its objects are called types) a special category
P (X) which in the most simple case can be represented by a category of of all
subobjects of X. In order to separate a part inside the object it is necessary
to specify some property, or attribute which will be then used as a criterion
of determination whether a particular element belong to that part or not.
So, it is not very surprisingly that a category P (X) is called in this case a
category of attributes. of type X, while the morphisms of attributes is quite
natural to interpret as deductions, or logical consequences. As soon as h is
a functor its target must be a category by definition, so in our case it is so
called 2-category whose objects are categories and whose arrows are functors
between those categories. In particular, h puts in correspondence with each
morphism f : X → Y of a theory T (which is called a term) a substitution
functor sf : P (Y )→ P (X) which is exactly stands for all reasonable changes,
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or deductions. There is more: as William Lavwere noticed at the time this
substitution functor induces both left and right ajoints that correspond to
existential and universal quantifiers which are also morphisms of attributes
in 2-category in question. So, we may say that hyperdoctrine "builds up"a
non-trivial space of rational discourse over the initial category which can be
identified with the world as "a sum of all its modifications". 11
Thereby, all more or less significant changes that are not mere consequences
of Heyting structure in question but rather exceptions from it - singularities
which radically transform subject’s structure have a good chance of being
simply unnoticed.
If we could find some formal way of impact on Ω, which in reality would
correspond to subject’s encounter with "significant Other that is with something
traumatizing and/or dramatic enough to reorganize the whole system of
her existential values, then we would have at our disposal an algorithmic
procedure which would substantially expand the possibilities of our model.
A possible move would be to take a closer look at the "paradoxical"sets
already mentioned earlier , which are elements of themselves. Prohibition of
such constructions is a immediate consequence of axiom of regularity, but
this axiom is just one of the conditions for the possibility of constructing
a consistent axiomatic theory of sets. But now we are working, generally
speaking, in a totally different theory - category theory. Therefore, success of
our further study will entirely depend on accurate existential interpretation
of objects of the form A ∈ A.
Earlier we built all analytic of the world of intellectual function around
the concept of object A = (A,ExpA), where set A played role of supporting
set - some kind of a "fabric"of an intellectual object, but set A itself was
not presented inside. Now we want to complete Heyting-valued set A with
"paradoxical from the point of view of standard axiomatic set theory, element
11See.Егорычев И. Язык теории категорий и "границы мира". С. 40-47 for detail
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A, to emphasize with it two main points. First, the fact that this particular
object is not ordinary - it is such "thing"inside the subject’s world, consequences
of encounter with which do not fit into the familiar "logic of things". And
second, subject gets that opportunity to ascribe to this "thing"a degree
of it’s extraordinarity EssA(A,A): consequently, only such an intellectual
object A will truly affect core values of the subject of experience, for which
ExpA(A,A) = EssAA = 1. (1 here is maximal element of Heyting lattice
Ω. (Depending on context we will denote this element as M, >, or "true".
Correspondingly, minimal element we will denote 0, µ, ⊥, or "false".)
But that still is not all. The formal apparatus introduced here makes it
possible to speak also about the magnitude of the consequences produced by
such an added paradoxical element A. But to comprehend those resources we
must return for awhile to analysis of expressive power of Heyting algebra Ω.
Let’s remember first that an intuitionistic interpretation of logical negation
makes use of such an element of partially ordered structures as pseudocomplement,
which arises as quite natural weakening of properties of classical set theoretic
complement. If we separate a certain part A in a given set X, then it is natural
to call the rest of X a complement A to X, or not-A. It is obvious then that
the union of A and not-A will return us back a whole X, as well as that the
intersection of A and not-A is empty. The latter is also true for every subset
of A. The weakening of complement’s properties consists in that we keep only
this latter condition as it’s definition: so, pseudocomplement of an element a
of a partially ordered set L is the greatest element of all elements b ∈ L such
that a∧ b = ∅. A union, however, of such element with a not always returns
a maximal element 1 of L just as intuitionists wanted: while A AND not-A
is universally false, A OR not-A is not universally true!
Now, if we loosen this requirement of empty intersection still a bit more
- let’s say that the said intersection can not exceed a certain value c we
will get a definition of so called relative pseudocomplement - the greatest
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element of all elements b ∈ L such that b ∈ L, что a∧ b ≤ c (in this extented
sense an absolute pseudocomplement is pseudocomplement relative to 0 - a
minimal element of partially ordered structure) which precisely coincide with
intuitionistic definition of implication, or concept of consequence we’ve been




{s : p ∩ s ≤ q}
Which means precisely the following: an element q follows from p with
the degree s, or - in terms of the world of intellectual function - subject expect
with the degree of certainty s that q happened (or will happen) because of
p. At last we have a formal way of saying that an element a ∈ A essentially
affects another element b ∈ A if and only if EssAa ⇒ EssAb = 1, where
1 ∈ Ω is maximal value of the scale Ω.
However, we immediately encounter with another problem: the fact is
that one can formally demonstrate12:
p⇒ q = 1⇔ p ≤ q (1)
In other words, ordinary fact a can affect only those elements, which
"weight"is equal or more then it’s own. It can be understood more clearly
when we interpret partial order relation as inclusion of sets: the implication
"If Socrates is a human, then he is mortal"is true, only if humans are subset of
mortals. Consequently, if we demand from the start that EssAA = 1, then an
object A can be absolute cause only for those modifications, which "essence’
is also absolute. Which means that we have to axiomatically postulate the
power of affection of added intellectual object be sufficient for it would "shake
the very subject’s core i. e. affect maximally even such an element of object
12Badiou, A. Logics of worlds. New York, P.171 - 172
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A (which we will further denote ∅A and call inexistent of A) that ∀x ∈
A ExpA(x,∅A) = 0. In particular, EssA(∅A) = 0.
As a result, we will call a singular intellectual object a complete Heyting
valued set A = (A,ExpA) such that: A ∈ A;
EssAA = 1;
EssAA⇒ EssA∅A = 1.
The last condition is extremely important. As soon as in regular circumstances
EssA(∅A) = 0, it can be satisfied, by virtue of identity (1), only if EssAA = 0.
But EssAA = 1 by definition just introduced above. So, in order to satisfy
this condition it is necessary to radically change the function of expectation
ExpA: now this function must assign maximal value to former inexistent
of the object A ∅A ∈ A which immediately turns this inexistent into the
element with maximally manifested essence - what was totally ignored by
the subject before, now has the highest value for him.
But completeness of intellectual object A as a Heyting valued set requires
13 existence of inexistent in it - that’s why function of expectation must
change one more time and to "annihilate "speaking informally, some element
δ ∈ A who’s essence were not minimal, literally setting it to zero by ascribing
to this element a minimal value in . Ω.
Formal notation for this transformation, "death or destruction of δ will
look as follows: (EssAδ = p)→ (EssAδ = 0). However, the transformations
of the function of expectation itself, most likely, will not end there either.
By construction of the function Exp: ∀a ∈ A ExpA(δ, a) ≤ EssAδ. 14
When EssAδ = p it simply means that ExpA(δ, a) ≤ p. But as soon as
EssAδ = 0, ∀a ∈ A values of ExpA(δ, a) can not exceed zero, which means
13Egorychev I. Categorial analysis of A. Kurpatov’s "Methodology of thought"in context
of perspective AGI development. P. 45 http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18343/
14This identity follows immediately from the definition of function of expectation - from the
second axiom, in particular. Indeed, ∀a, b, c ∈ A ExpA(a, b)∩ExpA(b, c) ≤ ExpA(a, c).
Setting a and c equal δ, we get that ExpA(δ, b) ≤ EssAδ ∀b ∈ A.
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that ∀a ∈ A ExpA(δ, a) = 0.
Thus, it must be clear by now how radical are those tranformations
the function of expectation ExpA. undergoes. Do not forget, however, that
functions acts in Ω, and it would be more accurate to look at these revaluations





In words it means that if we have two functions of expectation ExpA
and Exp∗A, we can always can express Exp∗A as composition the old function
of expectation ExpA and some transformation (automorphism) α : Ω → Ω
chosen in such way that Exp∗A = α ◦ExpA. Said automorphism α formalizes
that "transvaluation of values which happens with the subject of experience
Ω after his traumatic encounter with the Other (singular intellectual object
A). In conclusion we must add that we do not need to keep this paradoxical
property of selfbelonging of the setA ∈ A: as soon as procedure of "sublimation
of inexistent’ is complete the element A can disappear from the set A leaving
the automorphism α instead - the rest will follow automatically.
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II.
Earlier we mentioned that the category of complete Ω- sets is categorically
equivalent to the category of sheaves built over Heyting algebra Ω. Due to
this fact the gluing axiom holds in it, while the possibility of gluing itself
can be identified with the ability of the subject to think in a given world. In
more general sense it means that given world is thinkable. But what exactly
do we mean when we say that "the world is thinkable"or that "there is
some logic immanent to the world"? We will proceed with the following
working definition borrowed from Kurpatov’s "methodology of thought": we
will say that a given world is thinkable if there is a method or procedure of
determination of any uncertain situation in extent sufficient for the subject
to have reasons for making a move from one state of affairs to another. This
epistemological idea can be formalized in two aspects: - first (internal) aspect
would concentrate on studying the structure of Ω in order to establish if it
is capable at least in principle of being reduced to alternative "either/or i. e.
to some binary choice;
- second aspect (external) consists in analytic of intellectual objects (as
we shall see - in literal sense of their disintegration) with the aim of detecting
inside them such a synthetic intellectual object (element of the world) which
would be typical in global sense, i. e. such, that it would represent synthetic
value of an object in the sense of subordination to it of all the other constituent
elements of given intellectual object in terms of its role, or weight in a
situation - that would be its least upper bound.
Now we will take a close look at both aspects.
The first aspect, from a formal point of view, will correspond to the
identification of all possible ways to map some fixed set Omega, which
represents the structure of differentiating ability of particular subject of
experience, into the set consisting of zero and one, considered, however,
also as a set with the Heyting algebra structure (further we will denote this
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structure as Ω0). The set {0, 1} is a standard model for the classical predicate
calculus for it can be easily endowed with Boolean algebra structure, which
at the same time is Heyting algebra as well.
With this said we need to identify not exactly all possible ways to map Ω
into Ω0 per se (there are exactly 2|Ω| of them ), but only so called surjective
homomorphisms of theese two structures as Heyting lattices. Surjectivity
means that elements of Ω must go both to zero and one, i. e. , every element
of Ω0 is an image at least of one element from Ω. Latter condition basically
secures the possibility of choice, for if all elements of Ω would go to, let’s say’
one, then there can be no question of any alternative whatsoever. Informally,
homomorphic mapping preserves structure, and in our case we want to preserve
lattice structure, i. e. we would want that upper bounds would go to upper
bounds, and lower bounds - to lower bounds. Below we will show that
mappings satisfying these conditions preserve order, minimal element of Ω
send into zero and maximal - into one. And finally there can not be more of
such mappings than the total amount of elements in Ω. All those mappings
φ : Ω → Ω0 identified in such way we will collect in one special set which
we will denote π(Ω) and we will call it the set of points, meaning that every
"point"symbolizes for us a possibility ( or rather, a necessity) of choice for
the subject - the place of making a decision.
We by no means accidentally have chosen this very word - the place. Now
we will demonstrate that set π(Ω) has a structure of topological space, so
every point in it can be localized.
In order to define a structure of a topological space on a set X it is
necessary to specify a system of neighborhoods. But another way to do it is
to correspond to each part of X its interior. We might say that topological
space precisely is such an object in which the difference between the concepts
of "belong"and "be inside"is formalized, for in general for arbitrary A ⊆
X Int(A) 6= A).
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As Burbaki put it at the time, if we start with the concept of proximity
in its physical sense, it’s quite natural to say that a part A of a set E is
a neighborhood of E’s element a, if, when we exchange this element a with
sufficiently close element b, then b will also belong to this neighborhood A.
Apparently, different elements will be considered as close to a, depending on
degree of approximation we are interested in., and it is is very important
that we are able to formulate quite a few properties of proximity (closeness)
without invoking the concept of a distance.
That’s why before we formalize the concept of "interior"as algebraic
operation with respect to which the algebra of subsets of a set X is closed
let’s try to understand intuitively what we expect of the concept "to be
inside what does it mean for us, for instance, to be inside of some city or the
part of it?
It becomes quite obvious that interior of the city coincide with the city
itself as the set of elements that belong to it, for when I’m in the city I’m
definitely is one of its elements. Hence, Int(X) = X.
Situation will change when we are talking about being inside some part
of the city - in this case we must eliminate those situations of being on
the boundary, which can be shared with some other parts of the same city.
Formally we write it as follows: ∀A ⊆ X Int(A) ⊆ A.
Now the only thing that left is y to understand is how does the interior of
the union of the two parts look, as well as interior of interior. But it’s easy:
- interior of the union of parts is the union of its interiors
Int(A ∪B) = Int(A) ∪ Int(B);
- interior of interior is manifestly tautological, albeit meticulous mathematicians
prudently have in their stock of concepts exactly the right one for such
"productive tautology": algebraic operation, which being applied to the the
same element more than once does not change the result, is called idempotent.
So, we will write:
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Int(Int(A)) = Int(A).
Actually, these four axioms completely exhaust the list of requirements
for the interior as algebraic operation, which will work as a formal instrument
marking a difference between "belongness"and "being inside". As you may
guess, there more then one instrument that can help to achieve this goal.
Nevetheless now we proceed as follows:
First of all to every value p ∈ Ω we put in correspondence the subset
Pp ⊆ π(Ω) consisting of those "points"φ : Ω→ Ω0 which send this particular
value p into 1 ∈ Ω0. In informal existential sense these are the "points"in
the space of thought of the subject of experience (living situations), where
all the elements of all intellectual objects relevant to given situation with the
degree p (or, as we will see later - with the degree not less then p) actively
participate in forming the subject’s idea of truth - we might call it as well "a
subject’s intuition of Good".
Pp = {φ : φ ∈ π(Ω) and φ(p) = 1}
Then, for every part of "space of points i. e. ∀A A ⊆ π(Ω) we define
interior of that part as the set of all active "points"which are contained in
A. In other words, scanning all parts Pp ⊆ π(Ω) we select only those, which
are themselves are parts of A and then we take their union:
Int(A) = ∪(Pp : Pp ⊆ A)
If you think about it, a connection of the interior of some subset with
the neighborhoods and, hence, with the proximity is pretty straightforward.
Indeed, we can look at the sets Pp ⊆ π(Ω) as at the sets of all neighborhoods
of the element p in Ω conceived also as a topological space. Such set of the
neighborhoods sometimes is called filter of ultrafilter - "a perfect localizing
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scheme". 15. Localization becomes verbatim when a partial order relation on
Ω is relation of inclusion: in this case ultrafilter "filters"in Ω all those parts
that contain p. In general, filter separates in Ω so called upper set. In the
context of our informal interpretation we want to emphasize that the set of
points of choice has interior, (a gut, backbone, or integrity, metaphorically
speaking) if they exhaust all those points that assign the maximum value
(attribute them as true, or just) to any properties manifested in some situation
with a degree p and above. Once again, the point φ ∈ A positively evaluating
at least one element p ∈ Ω belongs to Int(A), only if if along with this point φ,
A contains all "close"points, i. e. those, which evaluate positively as well (send
to 1) all elements "close"to p in topology, induced by system of ultrafilters
(i. e. all such q that q ≥ p).
A detailed proof that the concept of the interior of any part of a set
of points, thus defined, satisfies the four axioms of the interior, which we
formulated above, presented in our early monograph16. For an aspiring reader
we recommend to turn to it and independently verify all the proofs presented
there themselves.
Now we just have to add that the points of a binary choice, besides the
fact that they form a topological space, can, generally speaking, either not
exist at all, or differ significantly in quantity. So, we get at our disposal
additional metric, based on which we can measure the differentiating ability
of particular subject of experience and, consequently, better understand the
structure of her space of thought. Effective criteria of absence of decision
making points in the space of thought of the subject are the following two:
1.) Ω has not just Heyting, but Boolean structure - that is, informally
speaking, the subject is typical representative of classic rationality;
2.) There are no such elements i in Ω, that:
15https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filter_(mathematics)




if j < i, then j = µ.
We will call such i ∈ Ω isolates, for there are no intermediate values between
them and the minimal value - they are literary next after zero. It is possible
to formally demonstrate that provided the two above conditions met for Ω,
there is no single place for choice in such space of thought whatsoever.
Philosopher Alain Badiou calls atonic those worlds, where decision is
impossible: "That’s the kind of happiness that the advocates of democratic
materialism dream of: nothing happens, but for the death that we do our
best to put out of sight. "17 But we might just as well keep the formal
term "pointless which works equally perfect as a metaphor of "pointless
existence"in such worlds.
At the time we commented on this in a following way: "It is difficult
to disagree with him, given the trends that really developed in the 20th
century - from purely theoretical efforts of the postmodern philosophy to
overcome every metanarrative and to deconstruct every binary opposition to
the democratic movements in politics, the extreme manifestation of which is
by no means theoretical deconstruction of sex, i. e. , deconstruction of the
fundamental opposition male/female, as well as the desire to appreciate all
socio-political minorities and "discourses". The latter, by the way, could be
taken as transcendental criterion of anonic world: in a world where everyone
tries to understand everyone, where everything communicates with everything,
it is impossible to be alone. Total communication makes solitude impossible,
whereas radical subjectivation always demands isolation. 18
To put aside politics it is still quite obvious that even in a purely pragmatic
context of AGI development a categorial model with pointless structure of
Ω is not very useful - especially since the machine intelligence turns out to
17Badiou A. Logics of worlds. N.Y. Continuum, 2009, P. 420
18Егорычев И. Системы мысли в европейской культуре. СПб, Наука, 2014. С. 219
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be in demand mainly for the purpose of fast decision-making in situations
where the "human factor"tends to significantly slow down the process. On
the contrary, it would be convenient not only to be able to simulate the space
of thought in which solutions are possible, but also to simulate worlds with
desired number of points.
In present study we will prove the theorem that states that the maximum
number of points in a given space of thought cannot exceed the number of
elements of Ω, and that this maximum is achieved.
Indeed, let Ω0 denote the lattice {0, 1}, Ω - the lattice, where every subset
has meet (it can be, for instance, any finite lattice), and let f : Ω→ Ω0 be the
map that conserves all meets and joins (may be infinite), i. e. f is a "point".






































f(p), and, since all p ∈ P , then
all f(p) = 1. Hence, f(q) = 1.
We will show that if for some p ∈ Ω is true that q ≤ p, then f(p) = 1. Since
p ∨ q = p, then f(p) = f(p ∨ q) = f(p) ∨ f(q) = f(p) ∨ 1 = 1.




p, then q ≤ p.
As a result, for every point f : Ω→ Ω0 there exists qf ∈ Ω such that uniquely
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determines this point f . Namely, ∀p ∈ Ω
f(p) =
1, if q ≤ p0, othrwise
On the other hand, two different points f correspondes to different qf ∈ Ω,
and, consequently |π(Ω)| ≤ |Ω|. As an example of Ω, where the equality
|π(Ω)| = |Ω| is achieved it it suffices to consider any totally ordered set or
vice versa - a partially ordered set, where each element is incomparable.
Therefore, we just rigorously demonstrated the possibility of construction
of categorial models of spaces of thought where the number of decision making
points can be regulated in advance - in particular, by increasing or decreasing
the number of isolates in Ω.
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Finally, we proceed to the last part of our study, which, as stated above,
will be concentrated on the external aspect of the rationality of the subject.
We will show that the world of the intellectual function (the space of thought)
, considered as a category (or subcategory) of complete Heyting-valued sets,
has a very important and far from obvious property - it’s structure makes
possible "gluing". 19 Alain Badiou suggests that this property has a deep
informal meaning - he believes (and we will try to show that this conviction
has sufficient grounds) that gluing corresponds to the fact that a world as
such is reasonable. Moreover, it is reasonable in a sense that A. Kurpatov
ascribes to it in his methodology: providing the maximum number of relevant
facts has been collected , we are in principle able to reconstruct reality - to
reproduce its logical design, so to speak. But all the facts are never there - as
a result, this reconstruction is always local in nature, there is always a risk,
or the possibility that others will come and do better.
In this case reconstruction results in a certain constituent element of the
situation - a synthetic fact through which all other facts are defined. Let us
illustrate it with a relatively simple example.
Let’s choose some world first. For the sake of simplicity we will use the
very same example, Alain Badiou refers to himself - it will be the "painting-
world"of Hubert Robert "The Bathing Pool which depicts naked and half-
naked women bathing in the forest against the background of the ruins of
an ancient temple. The temple occupies one of the central places in the
painting and obviously can be distinguished in this painting-world as an
intellectual object in the sense defined earlier. We can always rearrange
elements x of every intellectual object A depending on the value assigned
to them by function of expectation Ess(x). Indeed, it will be quite natural
to "fiber"the intellectual object (A,ExpA) in such way that a subset of those
and only those elements x inA, whose degree of proximity to themselves
19https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gluing_axiom
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equals p (EssA(x) = p), will be associated with the value p on the scale Ω.
For example, the three fully visible columns of the temple in the foreground of
Robert’s painting will have the maximum degree of Ess. The columns located
a little further on the right will have an intermediate degree, the barely
distinguishable columns on the left will be minimal, etc. As a result, we get
the fibration of the "temple"object into strictly homogeneous "layers". The
main difficulty will be that we want our analysis to "respect"the synthesis.
Suppose that we managed to select somehow a representative from each layer:
for example, each value p we put into corresponds with some specific column
that uniquely represents this value. The set of values in Omega has their
supremum simply by the construction of Heyting lattice. But is the opposite
also true? That is, is it true that, first, a group of columns as elements
of an object also has a supremum in the sense of real synthesis - as the
specific element that acts as a supremum for a given group of columns as
elements of the intellectual object "temple"? And, secondly, does this element
correspond to the value of the supremum in Omega that we get as a result
of the analysis? If the answer to this question turns out to be positive, then
we will be able to say that we have quite a strict rule according to which
the internal logic of the subject of experience, which helps him to order (to
create) his space of thought, can be consistently projected directly into the
world. As we will show below, such a strict rule does exist - to prove this
we will have to demonstrate that the mentioned above correspondence is,
first, a functor, and, second, this functor satisfies the gluing axiom, that is,
it is a sheaf . Finally, in conclusion, we will make as clear as possible the
connection between this categorical formalism, on the one hand, and the
rational synthesis in and of reality, on the other.
Badiou emphasizes that the successful implementation of such formal
possibility, firstly, is not something usual- on the contrary, the philosopher
calls those subjects who possess this skill geniuses. And nevertheless, any
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such reconstruction has a fundamentally local character - both in time and
in space. This, in particular, in his opinion, explains why even great victorious
generals fail sooner or later. 20
So, let’s work it out step by step.
First, note that any partially ordered set forms a category. Therefore, we
can examine the mapping F from Ω to Set, defined just as described above,
and make sure that this mapping is functorial, that is, extends to arrows. To











Most of what is depicted here has already been discussed. However, we
will repeat once again that over each value p ∈ Ω we sort of hang its own
"fiber the set of elements (details) x of intellectual object А = (A,ExpA)
such that, ExpA(x, x) = p. It means that for every object A ∈ CΩ− Set we
have corresponding, identically constructed mapping FA : Ω→ Set. Notice,
that these morphisms act precisely into category of ordinary sets - just the
rule that regulates them couldn’t be defined without the additional (Heyting-
valued) structure, which itself depends on the organization of function of
expectation. The same applies to the so far unfamiliar arrow, indicated on
the diagram as ϕq(x) : FA(p)→ FA(q) - it’s an ordinary function defined on
sets, but its definition is also essentially depends on Heyting-valued structure
imposed on our sets, as well as on completeness of these Heyting-valued sets.
20Badiou A. Logics of worlds. N.Y. Continuum, 2009, P. 288
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Robert Goldbladtt wrote on the subject the following: "The completeness
property of an Ω-set allows a very elegant treatment of the idea of the
restriction of a function to an open set. The development of this theory is due
to Dana Scott and Michael Fourman.21 The fat is that given a ∈ A and p ∈ Ω
a function defined as ExpA(a, x)∩p turns out to be singleton, i. e. singles out
in object A the part with no more than one element exhibiting some property
π with maximal degree. But since the set A is complete, then it by definition22
has a unique element b ∈ A, for which ExpA(b, x) = ExpA(a, x) ∩ p. Such
atomic signifier 23 b(x) we will call restriction of a(x) on value p and denote
as a  p.
That is we make a move, far from trivial: based on element a ∈ FA(p)
we construct singleton (atomic predicate) a(x) = ExpA(a, x), restrict it on
q ∈ Ω building, generally speaking, a new atomic predicate ExpA(a, x) ∩ q
which, due to completeness of set A, corresponds to atomic predicate b(x) =
ExpA(b, x) = ExpA(a, x) ∩ q completely determined by a single element b ∈
A. And that is precisely the rule, which defines the arrow ϕq(x) = x  q.
However, in order f to be sure that this function is defined correctly, we still
need to prove that all b ∈ A selected in this way are indeed contained in its
subset FA(q) ⊆ A.
Consider ExpA(b, x) = ExpA(a, x)∩q. Assuming x = b, we haveExpA(b, b) =
ExpA(a, b) ∩ q. That is
EssA(b) = ExpA(a, b) ∩ q (1)
Assuming further x = a, we get ExpA(b, a) = ExpA(a, a)∩q, or ExpA(a, b) =
21Goldblatt R. Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. N. Y. 2006, P. 389
22For rigorous definitions of singleton and completeness property see: Goldblatt R. Topoi.
The categorial analysis of logic. N. Y. 2006, P. 388
23More on this see in: Egorychev I. Categorial analysis of A. Kurpatov’s
"Methodology of thought"in context of perspective AGI development.P. 42-43. http:
//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/18343/
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EssA(a)∩ q. Then it follows from (1) that EssA(b) = EssA(a)∩ q∩ q. But b,
by assumption, is ExpA(a, x)∩ q, so EssA(a  q) = EssA(a)∩ q. Again, since
a ∈ FA(p) and, consequently, EssA(a) = p, it means that EssA(a  q) = p∩q,
and since q ≤ p, then EssA(a  q) = q, consequently ∀a ∈ FA(p) b = a  q
indeed is contained in FA(q). The statement is proven.
Up to this moment we have done not so little - we built a functor F from Ω
to Set. This functor, as someone may have noticed after carefully examining
the above diagram, "reverses the arrows and precisely such functor is called
contravariant The same functor has another name in category theory - textit
presheaf. Generally speaking, presheaves (and sheaves) were traditionally
considered over topological spaces, and only the brilliant Alexander Grothendieck
noticed that the very same gluing axiom can be reformulated in terms of
categorical properties, which are much more abstract. As a result of such
a deep generalization, presheaves and sheaves became possible to study as
functors of a certain type, acting from a category on which it is possible
to define a structure resembling the structure of a topological spaceю In
particular, our functor F : Ω → Set also can be proved to be a sheaf, if
we show that, first, there is such a structure on Ω, and second, if it satisfies
the gluing axiom. By the way, , it’s time to say something valid about this
axiom.
The very idea of Heyting-valued sets arose in order to be able to talk
about the so-called "potentially existing"elements - that is, elements that
do not exist actually (absolutely), but only with a certain degree, which
turned out to be very convenient to measure with a partially ordered scale.
Initially, as these potentially existing elements, one used to consider functions
defined on parts of some topological space X. Since these functions were only
partially defined (that is, not on the whole X, but only on its subsets), it
could be quite meaningful to speak both of actually existing elements, that
is, those that are defined on the wholeX, and about elements that exist only
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to a certain degree, depending on the size of the subset on which they were
defined.
Moreover, if, say, the function f is defined on U ⊆ X and the function g
is defined on V ⊆ X, then we could talk both about the degree of proximity
f and g, defining it as the interior of such an intersection U ∩ V , for which
f = g, and about the compatibility of these functions as the elements - that is,
about a situation in which the values of f and g coincide as much as possible,
that is, on the entire intersection U ∩V . Evidently, if such a condition is met,
these elements can be "glued"together and we get a new function h, defined
on a larger subset, namely, on the union U∪V . It is precisely the same idea is
at the heart of the gluing axiom, which a contravariant functor must satisfy
in order to be a sheaf.
Since we are now talking about a sheaf over the category Ω, first of all
for each object of this category we need to define its covering family, as
Alexander Grothendieck called it, the totality of which allows us to consider
the category, so to speak, topologically. Generally speaking, a covering Cov,
or Grothendieck topology on a category C, is assignment to each object a of
some specially arranged set of arrows with target in a. The key requirement
for such a family of arrows is the following: if {ai → a}i∈I ∈ Cov(a) and
aj → a is an arrow of Cov(a), then for every arrow ai → a there exists
cartesian square
aj ×a ai ai
aj a
and covering family {aj×aai → aj}i∈I ∈ Cov(aj). Less formally it means that
intersection of every two covers is a cover for the intersecting components.
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Now, as soon as F is a contravariant functor, then the arrows aj ×a ai → ai
and aj ×a ai → aj have "inverted"images f ij : F (ai) → F (aj ×a ai) and
f ji : F (aj) → F (aj ×a ai) in Set. If we now denote arrow F (a) → F (ai)
which also always exists, as fi, then in maximally general, categorial terms
gluing axiom will sound as follows:
given any cover {ai → a}i∈I ∈ Cov(a) and any selection of elements
si ∈ F (ai) that are pairwise compatible, i. e. f ij(si) = f
j
i (sj), then there is
exactly one s ∈ F (a) such that fi(s) = si.
If functors from an arbitrary category (C,CovC) in Set satisfy the gluing
axiom, then their collection forms a category of sheaves over C, and any
category equivalent to it is called Grothendieck topos.
Note that in the category of complete Heyting-valued sets, this axiom is
equivalent to the condition that ∀A ∈ CΩ − Set every subset B ⊆ A of
elements that are pairwise compatible, has unique supremum.
Remember our question if the group of columns has a supremum? So the
answer is positive, long as the columns are compatible elements.
A few words should be said now both about what compatible elements
are in case of complete Heyting-valued set A, and about how a certain order
arises on them, since the latter is obviously necessary if one wants to talk
about upper or lower bounds.
In our particular case of a partially ordered set Ω considered as a category,
a covering CovΩ is a family of mappings, which each object q ∈ Ω put into
correspondence to the set of subsets C ⊆ Ω, such that
⋃
C = q.
Recall that in the category Ω there is an arrow from p to q if and only
if pleqq. That is, the covering Omega actually forms a set of arrows p ≤ q,
or elements p leqq for each q in Omega. Obviously, q will be the least upper
bound of the set of all such elements. Recall also that the functorial images of
arrows of of the form q rightarrowp in Omega were defined as the restrictions
of all singletons a = ExpA(a, x) inFA(p) on q. Accordingly, if we fix two
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elements q and q′ in the subset C ⊆ Ω :
⋃
C = p, and choose representatives
sq ∈ F (q) and sq′ ∈ F (q′) in the sets that correspond to the images of q and
q′, then the compatibility condition from the gluing axiom takes the form:
sq  q ∩ q′ = sq′  q ∩ q′
However, using a number of identities that, say, Goldbladt suggests as exercises24,
we can transform this equality a little further:
sq  q ∩ q′ = (sq  q)  q′ = (sq  EssA(sq))  q′ = sq  q′ = sq  EssA(sq′)
But on the other hand:
sq′  q ∩ q′ = (sq′  q′)  q = (sq′  EssA(sq′))  q = sq′  q = sq′  EssA(sq)
And therefore we may contend that in the complete Heyting-valued set A two
elements sq, sq′ ∈ B ⊆ A are compatible (further we will denote compatibility
as sq v sq′) if:
sq  EssA(sq′) = sq′  EssA(sq).
Recall that in the geometrical (topological) interpretation, the compatibility
of two elements f and g means matching of their values as functions on
the whole intersection of their domains. That is, if, for arbitrary f and
g Exp(f, g) ≤ Ess(f) ∩ Ess(g), then under compatibility the equality is
achieved: Exp(f, g) = Ess(f) capEss(g). The fact that equality is actually
achieved follows almost immediately from the definition of compatibility
given above, and may, generally speaking, serve as a definition itself. Moreover,
this identity allows us to consider much more clearly the second aspect
of compatibility - the logical one, which, for obvious reasons, will interest
24Goldblatt R. Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. N. Y. 2006, P. 389
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us to a much greater extent. Geometric and logical aspects are invariably
present in the categorical analysis of sheaves - the founder of category theory
Saunders MacLane even wrote a fundamental work with the self-explanatory
title "Sheaves in geometry and logic"25, devoted to two of these intertwining
aspects.
When we described so-called atomic signifiers, or atomic predicate functions,
we identified them with ostensive predicates of the form: "It is just like this
a"It is in this identification that the close onto-logical connection between
singletons as logical units (lingering towards language) and elements of Heyting-
valued set as perceived details of the world , abstracted, so to speak, by the
subject of experience from reality, is manifested. And then the compatibility
of two singletons, from a logical point of view, will mean that they "communicate
the same about others or that they, as elements, are equally different from
all other elements x ∈ A. (They are the least different comparing with the
rest where they coincide.) In one of our articles we brought the example: we
proposed to imagine some fictional "office world"and two atomic predicates
"blonde"and "redhead". Real individuals working in the office will be compatible
if their overall evaluation in the existential hierarchy of the office world would
be identical - they would both, say, be workaholics, both would be the heads
of their own departments etc. 26
Next. Our predicate function had the form π(x) : A −→ Ω. Singleton, or
atomic predicate function in this sense is basically the same - it is a measuring
of a degree of proximity of elements x ∈ A to an element a ∈ A on the scale Ω.
Hence, from a logical point of view, a restriction of a singleton sq  EssA(sq′)
must be understood as re-calibration of sorts of the scale Ω, so it would be
more sensitive to the characteristics of the element sq′ . It’s a "truncation"of
Ω up to the element EssA(sq′) = p, so it become the maximal element, or
25MacLane S. , Moerdijk I. Sheaves in Geometry and Logic. New York: Springer-Verlag.
26Egorychev I. Thought and Being are the Same: Categorial Rendition of the Parmenidian
Thesis. Studies in Logic, Gramma and rhetoric, 46 (59) 2016, 193 - 210
32
"truth"in this new, recalibrated scale. it is obvious then that compatibility
as equality sq  EssA(sq′) = sq′  EssA(sq) is equivalence of all evaluations
of atomic predicates sq and sq′ on mutually re-calibrated scales.
Now, at last the reasoning in the world can be represented as totally
formal procedure:
1. Over any covering C ⊆ Ω, by construction of functor FA, there are
the layers FA(q) hanging - one for each q ∈ C. We remember also that⋃
C = p. Our analytic task is to choose from each part FA(q) ⊆ A exactly
one typical "representative"so that all of them would be pairwise compatible
with each other. Such a set of elements B ⊆ A has a unique supremum s(x) =⋃
sq∈B
ExpA(x, sq). The key point is that the equality sq = sq′  EssA(sq)
induces a partial order relation on the elements sq and sq′ which, in turn,
entails both their compatibility and the relation Ess(sq) ≤ Ess(sq′).27 And




singleton, only if all sq ∈ B are pairwise compatible, and the element s ∈ A,
which corresponds to the singleton s(x), is a least upper bound ∨B with
respect to the partial ordering < induced on the elements B.
2. We will show now that the element s = ∨B belongs to FA(p), that is
EssA(s) = p:
Since s = ∨B, then ∀sq ∈ B sq < s. That is the elements sq and s
are compatible and Ess(sq) ≤ Ess(s). It follows that Ess(sq) ∩ Ess(s) =
Ess(sq). On the other hand, for compatible elements the following equality
holds: Exp(sq, s) = Ess(sq) ∩ Ess(s). Consequently, Exp(sq, s) = Ess(sq).
Now, s(x) = ExpA(x, s) =
⋃
sq∈B




ExpA(s, sq), т. е. EssA(s) =
⋃
sq∈B
ExpA(s, sq). But Exp(sq, s) =









So, based on functorial analysis of intellectual object A we are able to
27Goldblatt R. Topoi. The categorial analysis of logic. N. Y. 2006, P. 390
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to "project"any covering C ⊆ Ω into this object and select in in it a part
B ⊆ A that consists of pairwise compatible representatives of stratum, that
corresponds to each value q ∈ C. The set of these representatives has an
ordered structure <, induced by relation Ess(sq) ≤ Ess(sq′), and there exists
a synthetic element s ∈ A, such that s = ∨B, и EssA(s) =
⋃
C. It means
that s represents both a kind of synthesis in reality, being the upper bound
for all the elements contained in the set B, and synthesis from the point of
view of the discriminating ability of the subject of experience, since it is a
representative of the stratum corresponding to the value p ∈ Ω, which, in
turn, is also the supremum for covering C.
The synthetic character of the element s, considered now as an atomic
predicate (signifier), is manifested in its fullest in that it is the logical equivalent
of the geometric axiom of gluing, since ∀sq ∈ B s  q = sq!
Indeed, ∀sq ∈ B sq < s. In means, by definition of "ontological"order,
that sq = s  EssA(sq). But EssA(sq) = q, consequently s  q = sq. That is,
as a predicate function, a given element, being appropriately calibrated to
any subset p ∈ Ω, will automatically generate a new atomic predicate that
locally most accurately captures, so to speak, "its area of responsibility"
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Conclusion
So, the "translation"of the methodology of thought from the language
used by A. Kurpatov into the formal language of category theory was carried
out in a rather "natural"way - in the sense that in the course of work
we did not have to adjust anything by design to fit desired definitions.
If you understand well enough both what the author wants to say and
what categorical constructions are, then the analogies become quite obvious.
This important fact suggests that informal, but still intelligible and rational
reasoning can at least in principle be reformulated in the language of category
theory, which, on contrary, being a part of algebra, is completely formal.
In other words, on this basis we assume that there is a certain universal
system of symbols that can be effectively used as a kind of unified universal
language of any science. It may not necessarily be category theory in the
form it is known to us at the present time, but even now it seems seems very
likely that the basis of such a language would still consist of objects, arrows
and manipulation rules agreed with them in a certain way. The use of a
surprisingly similar toolkit in such diverse areas of human knowledge makes
it possible to think that despite the apparent differences,we, to Leibniz’s
delight, as rational beings are engaged in something very, very uniform.
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